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This case is the result of an auto/infant pedestrian 
accident that occurred on Manti's Main Street. Prior to the trial, 
the parties stipulated that the driver's insurance company would 
pay the policy limits if the jury found that the driver ("Coons") 
was one percent (1%) or more negligent (R. 60-62 Appellee's Brief, 
Ex. B) . However, the jury found that the driver was not negligent 
(R. 213 Appellee's Brief, Ex. C). 
In his opening brief, the appellant (hereinafter 
"Johnson" or the "Johnson child") argued that any disciplined 
review of the undisputed evidence shows that reasonable minds must 
conclude that Coons was to some degree negligent. More 
specifically, Johnson said that it is undisputed that Coons saw the 
Johnson child more than 200 feet away, Coons had a duty to slow 
down but did not, Coons had a duty to pay attention to the child 
but did not, and that had Coons slowed down or paid attention to 
the child, there would have been no accident. 
Johnson also showed that he should be awarded a new 
trial because, over his counsel's objection, Coons was allowed to 
present sympathetic and prejudicial statements to the jury. Coons 
and his counsel told the jury that (1) Coons did not feel well at 
trial because he had suffered from a parachute accident while 
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serving with the 82nd Airborne Division; (2) Coons has served his 
country as an ex-infantry captain; and (3) Coons had suffered 13 
operations and was disabled. Finally, Johnson said that twice 
during the trial proceedings, Coons had improper contact with 
members of the jury and discussed activities as mutual friends. 
The Court declined Coons' "Motion For a Judgment N.O.V. or in the 
Alternative a New Trial." 
In its answering brief, Coons claims that Johnson 
failed to demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient to support 
the verdict (Appellee's brief, p.6). Coons says Johnson has not 
marshalled the evidence supporting the verdict. Coons also denies 
that he had a duty to slow down or pay attention to the child after 
he observed the child on the side of the road (Appellee's brief, 
p.5). In addition, Coons argues that Johnson waived any claim of 
improper jury contact because his guardian and mother witnessed the 
improper contact before jury deliberations but did not complain 
until after the jury deliberations (Appellee's brief, pp. 5, 
25-29). 
Further, Coons incredibly argues that there was no 
prejudicial testimony appealing to sympathy (Appellee's brief, 
p. 31). However, Coons undermines his own argument when he notes 
that the trial court repeatedly gave instructions that the jury was 
not to decide the case on sympathy. Coons then subsequently 
attempts to misdirect the court's attention from this issue by 
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arguing that "at trial [Johnson] either blessed or waived what he 
now condemns" (Appellee's brief, pp. 37-38). Moreover, Coons says 
that if there was any improper sympathetic testimony, it was 
Johnson's fault because "it resulted from the abusive, protracted 
examination of Coons by plaintiff's [Johnson's] counsel" 
(Appellee's brief pp. 6, 39-42). Finally, Coons claims that any 
trial court errors were not prejudicial. Coons' brief also 
contains many factual and legal misstatements. 
This reply brief responds to each of Coons' foregoing 
arguments and the factual and legal misstatements set forth in 
Coons' brief. 
IV. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
BECAUSE COONS HAD A DUTY TO MAINTAIN A PROPER LOOKOUT 
TOWARDS THE CHILDREN AND A MARSHALLING OF THE 
EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT ALL REASONABLE MINDS MUST 
CONCLUDE THAT COONS BREACHED THE DUTY 
Coons is mistaken when he alleges that he did not have 
a duty to maintain his lookout on the children near the side of the 
road (Appellee's brief, p.6). Once Coons observed the Johnson 
child near the side of the road, he had a duty to maintain a 
reasonable proper and adequate lookout. The lookout duty required 
Coons to recurrently reobserve and reappraise the situation. The 
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failure to do so is negligence. E.g., Anderson v. Bradley, 590 
P.2d, 329, 342 (Utah 1979). 
Further, a marshalling of the evidence not in dispute 
unquestionably establishes that Coons did not maintain his lookout 
towards the children. He took his eyes off the children for two to 
three seconds, so that he did not observe the Johnson child 
crossing the road until it was too late to avoid the accident. As 
such, all reasonable minds must conclude that Coons was to some 
degree negligent. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
VERDICT BECAUSE COONS HAD A DUTY TO SLOW DOWN 
UPON SEEING THE CHILDREN PLAYING NEAR THE 
ROAD AND A MARSHALLING OF THE EVIDENCE 
SHOWS THAT ALL REASONABLE MINDS MUST 
CONCLUDE THAT COONS BREACHED THE DUTY 
Coons is also mistaken when he alleges that he did not 
have a duty to slow down after observing the Johnson child playing 
on the side of the road (Appellee's brief, p. 5). The cases and 
statutes establishing the duty are found on pp. 19-21 of the Brief 
of the Appellant and will not be repeated here. 
Moreover, a marshalling of the undisputed testimony 
shows that Coons did not slow down upon seeing the Johnson child 
playing near the side of the road. As such, all reasonable minds 
must conclude that Coons breached his duty to slow down. 
Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to support the verdict. 
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POINT III. 
THE CONCLUSORY STATEMENTS AND EVIDENCE 
CITED IN APPELLEE'S BRIEF ARE INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
As set forth in Point III of this brief, the evidence 
cited by the Appellee in his brief either (1) does not establish 
one way or the other whether Coons was negligent; or (2) consists 
of conclusory statements made by Coons' experts in direct 
contradiction to their factual testimony. As such, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict. 
POINT IV. 
THE JOHNSON CHILD DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO 
SEEK A NEW TRIAL DUE TO THE IMPROPER ARGUMENT 
AND TESTIMONY OFFERED BY COONS 
When Coons' counsel began to talk about Coons' 
military service and surgeries, Johnson's counsel promptly 
objected. However, because the objection was overruled, Johnson 
was not required to repeatedly object during the trial. To do so 
would have prejudiced Johnson in the eyes of the jury. 
POINT V. 
THE JOHNSON CHILD DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO 
SEEK A NEW TRIAL ON THE BASIS THAT COONS MADE 
IMPROPER CONTACT WITH THE JURY 
The lower court denied Johnson a new trial because 
Johnson's parent and guardian ad litem knew of Coons' improper 
contact with the jury prior to the verdict. However, the parent 
had no duty to protect the litigation rights of the child. In 
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addition, a guardian ad litem does not have the power to waive the 
child's litigation rights. In contrast, when Johnson's counsel 
learned of the improper juror contact, he timely moved for a new 
trial within the time allowed by Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, When confronted with the improper juror contact 
allegations, the lower court had a duty to protect the child as a 
ward of the court. Its failure to do so was reversible error. 
POINT VI. 
THE MISSTATEMENTS SET FORTH IN THE 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF DO NOT JUSTIFY THE 
LOWER COURT'S VERDICT AND JUDGMENT 
As specifically listed in Point IV of the argument 
section of this brief, the misstatements set forth in the 
Appellee's brief do not justify the lower court's verdict and 




THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
BECAUSE COONS HAD A DUTY TO MAINTAIN A PROPER LOOKOUT 
TOWARDS THE CHILDREN AND A MARSHALLING OF THE 
EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT ALL REASONABLE MINDS MUST 
CONCLUDE THAT COONS BREACHED THE DUTY 
A. Appellee's Brief. 
Coons maintains that he had no duty to keep his 
attention focused on the children playing near the side of the 
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road, (Appellee's brief, p. 5), and that appellant failed to 
marshall the evidence (Appellee's brief, p. 6). 
B. Standard of Review, 
Appellate courts review the existence of a duty in a 
negligence case under a correctness standard. E.g.f C.T. v. 
Martinez, 845 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah 1992). 
C. Analysis. 
Coons is mistaken when he alleges in his brief that he 
did not have a duty to maintain his attention on the children near 
the side of the road after he observed them. In Marquez v. Pepsi 
Cola Co. , 838 P.2d 660 (Utah App. 1992), the Utah Court of Appeals 
surveyed the Utah appellate cases defining a motorist's duty to 
look out for children and those cases which held, as a matter of 
law, that a motorist was negligent after failing to maintain a 
proper lookout. The Marquez court explained that in Solt v. 
Godfrey, 25 U.2d 210, 479 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 1971), the Utah 
Supreme Court set forth the duty of a motorist to keep a proper 
lookout as follows: 
Although the operator of a motor vehicle 
is not held as a matter of law, to be 
under a duty to look in a specific 
direction at a specific time, he must 
keep a lookout ahead, or in the 
direction in which he is traveling, or 
in the direction from which others may 
be expected to approach, and is bound to 
take notice of the road, to observe 
conditions along the way, or conditions 
immediately adjacent to the street, and 
-7-
to know what is in front of him for a 
reasonable distance. 
A motorist has no right to assume that 
the road or street is clear. He is 
bound to anticipate the presence thereon 
of other persons, vehicles or objects 
and children and be on the lookout for 
them, and act at all times so as to 
avoid collisions with them or injuring 
them. 
Marques. supra at 662. 
The Solt court determined that a motorist who hit a 
two year old child running into the street after a ball was 
negligent as a matter of law, Id. at 662. The court explained that 
the child was in plain view and that there was no sudden darting 
from behind anything which could have obscured the motorist's 
vision. Jd. Similarly, the Marquez court noted that other cases 
wherein the courts have found negligence as a matter of law 
occurred when the party had a clear and unobstructed view of the 
persons or objects prior to the accident. See Mingus v. Olsson, 
114 Utah 505, 201 P.2d 495, 498 (1949) (failed to look or, having 
looked, failed to see what he should have seen) ; Gilliland v. 
Rhoads, 539 P.2d 1221 (Wyo. 1975); Hallett v. Stone, 534 P.2d 232 
(Kan. 1975). 
Moreover at trial, Coons admitted that he owed a duty 
to the child to pay attention to him. 
Q: [D]on't you think it would be 
prudent when you're driving along 
and you see kids along the road to 
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keep your attention on them until 
you pass them? 
A: I sure do. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 244, 
lines 5-8.) 
In conclusion, contrary to the unsupported assertions 
in Coons1 brief, there is absolutely no question that once Coons 
observed the child playing near the side of the road 200 or more 
feet ahead, he had a duty to pay attention to the child until he 
passed the child. 
Johnson does not dispute that he has a duty to 
marshall all of the existing evidence in support of the verdict. 
The only lookout witness was Coons. Thus, the only evidence to 
marshall is Coons' testimony. That evidence is marshalled on pp. 
9-12 and 23-24 of appellant's opening brief. The marshalled 
evidence shows that there is no factual dispute that after Coons 
saw the Johnson child on the side of the road, he did not continue 
a proper lookout. Instead, he took his eyes off of the children 
for two to three seconds. By the time he saw the child again, 
Coons was unable to avoid the accident. (Tr., Vol. I, pp. 222, 
223, 219, 230 and 240). 
In this appeal, Johnson has not selected parts of the 
record favorable to him and ignored other parts. Instead, Johnson 
marshalled and summarized all of the evidence on the lookout issue. 
The only evidence favorable to Coons was his preliminary testimony 
that he "was watching forward and staying in the same lane. But at 
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the same time I always glance at my mirrors." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 205, 
lines 3-19) , (Appellant's brief, p. 20.) But, he went on to 
explain that he took his eyes off of the road for two to three 
seconds. Thus, a marshalling of the evidence on the lookout issue 
shows that all reasonable minds must conclude that Coons breached 
his duty to maintain a proper lookout towards the children on the 
side of the road. Therefore, there was insufficient evidence to 
support the verdict.1 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
VERDICT BECAUSE COONS HAD A DUTY TO SLOW DOWN 
UPON SEEING THE CHILDREN PLAYING NEAR THE 
ROAD AND A MARSHALLING OF THE EVIDENCE 
SHOWS THAT ALL REASONABLE MINDS MUST 
CONCLUDE THAT COONS BREACHED THE DUTY 
A. Appellee's Brief. 
Coons, in his answering brief, alleges that Coons "did 
not have a duty to slow down" after observing the Johnson child 
playing on the side of the road. (Appellee's brief, p.5). 
B. Standard of Review. 
Whether a duty exists in a negligence case is a legal 
issue reviewed under a correctness standard without deference to 
the trial court. C. T. v. Martinez, supra. A determination of 
negligence becomes a question of law when the undisputed facts 
l
. The judgment was based solely on the jury's finding of no 
negligence. The jury did not reach the issue of proximate cause. 
(R. 213, 218-220.) 
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permit only one reasonable conclusion. FMA Acceptance Co. v. 
Leatherbury Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah, 1979); Marguez v. 
Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., supra. 
C. Analysis. 
Contrary to the unsupported assertions in Coons' 
brief, there is also absolutely no question that Coons, upon seeing 
the children 200 feet away, had a duty to slow down. Cases 
establishing the duty are set forth in pp. 19-27 of the appellants 
opening brief and will not be repeated here. The duty is also 
codified in Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-80 and 41-6-46(1). 
The marshalled evidence unquestionably shows that 
Coons did not slow down. As explained by his accident 
reconstructionist, the only evidence of speed in this case is 
Coons1 testimony. There is no objective data, there is no 
conflicting testimony (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 455-456). Coons testified 
that he was on cruise control at 30 miles per hour until he slammed 
on his brakes just before impact. He also testified that he did 
not believe it was prudent to turn off the cruise control when he 
first observed the children (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 235, 245, 134, 136). 
Moreover, all of the expert testimony at trial concluded that had 
Coons slowed down, Coons could have avoided the accident, because 
it took the Johnson child 6.1 to 7.8 seconds to cross the road and 
Coons only needed 3.8 to 4 seconds to stop (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 285-
288, 372, 490-493). 
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Since a marshalling of the evidence indisputably shows 
that Coons breached his duty to slow down after observing the 
children on the side of the road, and that had he done so, the 
accident would have been avoided, all reasonable minds must 
conclude that Coons was to some degree negligent. Thus, there is 
insufficient evidence to support the verdict that Coons was not 
somewhat negligent. 
POINT III. 
THE CONCLUSORY STATEMENTS AND EVIDENCE CITED 
IN APPELLEE'S BRIEF ARE INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT 
A. Appellee's Brief. 
Coons summarized what he believes to be the evidence 
supporting the verdict in pages 8-12 of his brief. First, Coons 
cites to his accident reconstruction expert's conclusion that the 
only thing Coons could have done to avoid the accident was to be 
clairvoyant. However, the factual testimony of the expert is 
contrary to his conclusion. Coons' expert calculated that Coons 
was 2 07 feet away when he first saw the Johnson child (Tr. Vol. II, 
p. 489, lines 20-25) . He also acknowledged that Coons was going 30 
miles per hour (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 455-466) , and that the Johnson 
child was going 7.7 to 10.7 feet per second (Tr. Vol. II, p. 460). 
The expert also testified that it should have taken Coons only 43 
feet, or about 2 seconds to stop from 3 0 miles per hour (Tr. Vol. 
II, p. 480) . Thus, if it takes the Johnson child at least 6 
-12-
seconds to cross the road (7.7 to 10.7 feet per second divided into 
62 feet, the width of the road) , Coons had the time to see the 
child, slow down and stop. 
Next, Coons cites his expert's opinion that the 
accident was the child's fault (Appellee's brief, pp. 8-9). Of 
course, by law, the child cannot be at fault, and Coons' expert was 
well aware of the statute. (Tr. Vol. II, pp. 507-508) . More 
importantly, whether the Johnson child was at fault is immaterial. 
The parties stipulated that Coons' insurance company would pay the 
policy limits if Coons was to any degree negligent. Establishing 
that the child was negligent does not mean that the driver was not 
also negligent. 
Third, Coons points out that he testified that he was 
generally attentive (Appellee's brief, p. 9). However, when the 
specifics of his attentiveness were challenged, he admitted that he 
did not slow down and that he took his eyes off of the Johnson 
child for two to three seconds. 
Fourth, Coons cites the testimony of his other 
accident reconstructionist, Mr. Stevens. Stevens described what, 
in his view, is a motorist's duty to slow down and pay attention to 
the child. However, expert witnesses do not establish what the 
legal duty is; the appellate courts do. See State v. Penva, 869 
P.2d, 932, 936 (Utah 1994). Coons' duty to slow down and pay 
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attention to the child are correctly described in Points I and II 
of this brief, and pages 18-21 of the appellantfs opening brief. 
Subsequently, Coons cites the testimony of Roland 
Bagley that "the boy on the bike ran into the trailer." However, 
that statement neither proves nor disproves that Coons, the driver, 
was also negligent. 
Finally, the testimony of Jamie Johnson set forth in 
Appellee's brief, does not poke gaping holes in the plaintiff's 
theory of the case. Coons testified that he first observed the 
Johnson child playing near the side of the road with other 
children. 
Q: Now as you came north did there come 
a time when you observed Ren Johnson 
over on the west side of the street 
at 4th North. 
A: Yes, but I didn't just observe— 
observe him. There were a lot of 
kids—no, I guess you wouldn't say a 
lot of kids. There were a couple of 
kids with him on the west side and 
they began on the north corner on 
the west side but then there were 
also some kids running around on 
Mrs. Johnson's property on the—the 
east side. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 201, 
lines 21-25; 202, lines 1-3.) 
Thus, it is immaterial whether Johnson traveled south 
on the west side of the road before crossing Main Street. Coons' 
testimony was that, at the time of the accident, there was plenty 
of light and visibility was excellent. (Tr. Vol. I, pp. 200, lines 
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19-20; 201, lines 2-4, 19-20.) No party to this appeal has 
discovered or cited to any testimony showing that anything 
obstructed Coons' view from the time he first saw the Johnson child 
until the time of the collision. 
B. Analysis. 
The burden of showing that there is insufficient 
evidence to support the verdict is not much different than the 
showing required of a litigant successfully moving for summary 
judgment. A summary judgment is appropriate when there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law, e.g., Jackson v. Righter, 
259 U.A.R. 3 (Utah 1995). Further, the evidence is reviewed in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. Id. 
Similarly, an appellate court will not grant a new trial or reverse 
a verdict for insufficient evidence if reasonable men can draw 
different conclusions from conflicting evidence. Pollesche v. 
Transamerican Insurance Company, 27 U.2d 430, 434 497, P.2d 236 
(1972). Moreover, on review, the appellate courts review the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed at 
trial. Marquez, supra, at 661; Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 
(Utah 1988). The foregoing criteria are nearly identical. The 
difference is in a summary judgment proceeding, the court cannot 
weigh the testimony or the evidence submitted to it. See Singleton 
v. Alexander, 19 U.2d 292, 294 431 P,2d 126 (1967); Sandberg v. 
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Kline 576 P.2d 1291, (Utah 1978); Spor v. Crest Butte Silver 
Mining, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304, 1308 (Utah 1987). 
Johnson has not discovered any Utah appellate court 
decisions considering the issue of whether conclusory testimony is 
sufficient to support a verdict. However, there are many Utah 
cases holding that conclusory testimony, standing alone, is not 
sufficient to either obtain or oppose a summary judgment. See, 
e.g., Winter v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 820 P.2d 916, 919 (Utah 
1991); Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 102-103 (Utah 1992); 
(affidavit must set forth the specific facts that logically support 
the expert's conclusion); Gaw v. State, 798 P.2d 1130, 1137 (Utah 
App. 1988) (expert opinion must set forth a sufficient factual 
basis); see also Reagan Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Lundcrren, 692 
P.2d 776, 779 (Utah 1984) (factual conclusions are insufficient). 
Since the conclusory evidence cited in Coons1 brief is 
insufficient to support or oppose a summary judgment, and since the 
criteria for obtaining a summary judgment and challenging a verdict 
for insufficient evidence are comparable, it follows that the self-
serving conclusions set forth in Coons1 brief are insufficient to 
support the verdict. 
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POINT IV. 
THE JOHNSON CHILD DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO 
SEEK A NEW TRIAL DUE TO THE IMPROPER ARGUMENT 
AND SYMPATHETIC TESTIMONY OFFERED BY COONS 
A, Appellee's Brief. 
Coons in his brief argues: (1) There was no 
prejudicial appeal to sympathy; (2) Coons waived the issue by not 
including it in his docketing statement; (3) Coons waived the issue 
at trial; and (4) if there was sympathetic argument and testimony, 
the argument and testimony was harmless (Appellee's brief, pp. 
31-42) . 
B. Analysis. 
Coons is incorrect when he says that there was no 
prejudicial appeal to sympathy. Telling the jury about unrelated 
surgeries and the suffering resulting from the surgeries, is a 
prejudicial appeal to sympathy. Rogers v. Owens, 440 S.W.2d, 406, 
407 (Tex. App. 1968), reversed on other grounds 446 S.W.2d, 165 
(Tex. 1969) . So is a reference to war service, wounds or injuries. 
See Predovich v. New York Central R.R. Co. , 175 N.E. 580, 581 (111. 
App. 1961). 
Coons is also mistaken when he alleges that Johnson 
waived the issue at trial. When Coons' counsel started to tell the 
jury about Coons1 parachute accident, Johnsonfs counsel promptly 
objected, but was overruled (Tr. Vol. I, p. 115, lines 2-9). This 
objection preserved the issue for appeal. A subsequent objection 
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was not necessary. See also Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing Inc. , 787 
P. 2d, 525, 528 (Utah App. 1990) (A matter is sufficiently raised if 
it is submitted to the trial court and the trial court is offered 
an opportunity to rule on the issue) . Simply put, once a party has 
objected and attained a ruling clearly indicating the attitude of 
the court, the party is not required to repeat the objection each 
time the issue comes up. Once the court has clearly ruled, 
repeated objections serve only to waste the court's time and 
prejudice the objecting party in the eyes of the jury. E.g., 
United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d, 694, 695 (5th Cir. 1978); Ladd. 
"Common Mistakes in the Techniques of Trial," 22 Iowa Law Review, 
609 (1937); see also State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1071 (Utah 
1987); State v. Aquilar, 758 P.2d, 457, 458 (Utah App. 1988). 
Further, Johnson's subsequent acquiescence does not rise to the 
level of a blessing. Once the court allowed the statements about 
Coons' army service and surgeries and injuries, courtroom etiquette 
mandated deferential treatment. 
Coons is also incorrect when he argues that Johnson 
waived the issue when he failed to include it in his docketing 
statement. The cases cited in Coons' brief do not support his 
argument. The cases all involve situations wherein the appellant 
either did not file a notice of appeal, a docketing statement, or 
failed to set forth a jurisdictional basis of the appeal. 
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Coons' failure to find a Utah case holding that an 
issue is waived if not set forth in the docketing statement is not 
surprising, since the primary purpose of a docketing statement is 
only to assist the Court in determining whether the appeal should 
be heard by the Utah Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals (URAP 
9 (b) . An appellant is entitled to have the issues heard on appeal 
that he raised in the lower court. Issues not raised in the lower 
court ordinarily are not considered. E.g. Shire Development v. 
Frontier Investments, 799 P.2d, 221, 224 (Utah App. 1990). In this 
case, all of the appellate issues were raised in the lower court. 
The verdict was challenged for insufficient evidence in Johnson's 
Motion for a Judgment N.O.V., Or in the Alternative, a New Trial. 
In the same motion, Johnson asked for a new trial because of Coons' 
improper conduct with the jury (R. 229-252). As set forth above, 
Johnson timely objected to the sympathetic statements made by 
Coons' counsel. 
POINT V. 
THE JOHNSON CHILD DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT 
TO A NEW TRIAL ON THE BASIS THAT COONS 
MADE IMPROPER CONTACT WITH THE JURY 
A. Appellee's Brief. 
Coons claims that the Johnson child may not seek a new 
trial based on Coons' improper conduct with the jury because 
Johnson's parent and guardian knew of the contact prior to the time 
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the jury was instructed, but the Johnson child did not object until 
after the verdict (Appellee's brief, pp. 25-29). 
B. Analysis. 
The first problem with Appellee's argument is that it 
does not fully explain what occurred in the lower court. The 
affidavit of Johnson's mother (R. 223-224, Brief of Appellant, 
Ex. 4) shows on August 6, she observed, Michael Coons conversing 
with some jurors, discussing their mission and other matters. In 
addition, Johnson's guardian ad litem, and the guardian ad litem's 
legal assistant, observed Coons engaged in improper jury contact on 
the last day of the trial while Johnson's counsel was meeting with 
the court and Coons' counsel to construct jury instructions (R. 
223-226, Brief of Appellant, Ex. 4). However, Johnson's counsel 
did not learn of the improper contact until after the jury's 
verdict (R. 294-295, see brief of appellee, p. 29). Upon learning 
of the improper contact, Johnson's counsel filed a motion for a 
judgment N.O.V. or, in the alternative, a new trial. Thus, the 
narrow issue is whether the improper contact issue is waived when 
an infant's parent or guardian ad litem learns of the improper 
contact prior to the verdict but the infant's counsel does not. 
The second problem with Coons' argument is that none 
of the cases cited in his brief address this issue. None of the 
cases involves improper juror contact and none concerns a child 
plaintiff. In State v. Day, 815 P.2d, 1345, 1349 (Utah App. 1991), 
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the Court of Appeals held that failure to raise an objection of 
improper juror contact is waived when the party's counsel knew of 
the contact prior to the verdict, but failed to object to the trial 
court. In this case, Johnson's counsel met the standard. After 
the verdict, and upon learning of Coons' improper contact with the 
jury, he filed a motion for a new trial within the time limits 
allowed by Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
In State v. Pike, 712 P.2d, 277 (Utah 1985), a case of 
improper juror contact with facts similar to the case at Bar, the 
trial court and counsel agreed to let the incident go until after 
the verdict. However, by allowing the trial court to make a 
decision after the trial, the appellant did not waive his right of 
appellate review. See Id. at 279. Thus, simply because Johnson 
asked the trial court to review the issue after the verdict should 
not operate as a waiver of the child's right of review. 
Further, Coons' argument that the child should be 
found to have waived his right to appellate review because his 
guardian ad litem and parent knew of the misconduct prior to the 
verdict fails to consider the proper relationship of the parent, 
the guardian ad litem, the child and the court.2 "Historically, 
the law has recognized that special rules are necessary to protect 
2
 That relationship was explained to the trial court in 
Johnson's "Memorandum in Response to Order on Motions" (R. 294-
298) . 
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the legal rights of children • . . . Because of their lack of 
experience, judgment, knowledge, resources, and awareness, minors 
cannot effectively assert and protect their legal rights." Lee v. 
Gaufin, 867 P.2d, 572, 578 (Utah 1993). M[C]ourts have typically 
treated minors involved in litigation as if they were wards of the 
court, even when a minor has an adult representative who appears in 
court as a guardian ad litem." Id. 
In this case, the lower court did not treat the child 
as a ward of the court. Instead, it summarily dismissed the 
child's claim of improper jury misconduct because the childfs 
parent and guardian ad litem knew of improper contact prior to the 
verdict (R. 327-328) . However, a parent does not have a legal duty 
to assert or otherwise protect a minor's legal claim. Id., at 578. 
Parents or natural guardians have no specific legal duty to perform 
and have no responsibility to their minor offspring other than 
their moral obligation. Scott v. School Board of Granite School 
District, 568 P.2d 746, 747 (Utah 1977). Thus, the court could not 
impose a waiver upon the child for the parent's failure to do 
something the parent has no duty to do. Similarly, a guardian ad 
litem cannot bind the infant by any waivers "except as to such 
minor matters as are necessary to facilitate the purposes of the 
suit and do not affect the infant's substantive rights." 42 Am. 
Jur. 2d Infant § 184 at 169-70 (1969). 
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In summary, the guardian ad litem had no power to 
waive the child's litigation rights, the parent had no duty to 
protect the child's litigation rights, Johnson's counsel acted in 
a timely fashion to protect the child's litigation rights, but the 
court failed in its duty to protect the child as the court's ward. 
The sum of the foregoing requires a new trial. 
POINT VI. 
THE MISSTATEMENTS SET FORTH IN THE APPELLEE'S 
BRIEF DO NOT JUSTIFY THE LOWER COURT'S 
VERDICT AND JUDGMENT 
The following facts and legal misstatements set forth 
in Appellee's brief do not justify the lower court's verdict and 
judgment: 
1. Appellee mistakenly alleges that this is a child 
dart out case. (Appellee's brief, p. 2). This is not a child dart 
out case. As set forth in the statement of the case section of the 
appellant's opening brief, unlike a dart out case, the motorist's 
view was not obstructed. Coons saw the child playing near the side 
of the road approximately 200 feet before the collision. Moreover, 
the child did not come from Coons' side of the road. He began 
crossing the road from the opposite side. Two cars in the traffic 
lane closest to the Johnson child were able to stop and avoid 
harming the child. However, Coons, traveling in the farthest lane 
of traffic, did not stop or avoid the accident. 
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2. This appeal is not based on, and never was based 
on, the notion that because an accident occurred, someone was 
negligent (Appelleefs brief, pp. 5, 15). What this appeal is 
based on, is that all reasonable minds must conclude that Coons 
breached two duties of care (lookout and speed) so Coons was at 
least to some small degree negligent. See Points I and II of this 
brief. 
3. The errors committed by the lower court were not 
harmless (Appellee's brief pp. 19-22). A judgment and verdict 
based upon insufficient evidence is not harmless error, it is 
prejudicial error, requiring a new trial. Moreover, once improper 
juror contact is shown, the contact is presumed prejudicial absent 
a satisfactory explanation. State v. Pike, supra. Finally, to show 
that the sympathetic statements made by Coons and his counsel were 
prejudicial only requires that Johnson establish that there is a 
reasonable likelihood that a more favorable result would have been 
obtained absent the sympathetic statements. The overwhelming 
evidence that Coons breached his duty to maintain a proper lookout 
and his duty to slow down, coupled with the juryfs finding of no 
negligence and the sympathetic statements made to the jury, 
unquestionably establishes that there is a reasonable likelihood 





A marshalling of all of the evidence in support of the 
verdict unquestionably establishes that all reasonable minds must 
conclude that Coons was to some degree negligent. That is, Coons 
breached his duty to maintain a proper lookout towards the Johnson 
child, and he breached his duty to maintain a proper speed upon 
seeing the children on the side of the road. Moreover, the 
conclusory statements set forth in appellee's brief are 
insufficient to support the verdict. The Johnson child did not 
waive his right to obtain a new trial based upon Coons' improper 
contact with the jury or upon Coons' prejudicial appeal to 
sympathy. All of the foregoing requires either a new trial or a 
judgment N.O.V. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of April, 1995. 
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